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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the reasons why inequality, and distribution more generally, have come to the fore in 
the development discourse at the tum of the century, after a period of relative neglect in the 1980s. The paper 
considers, in particular the analysis of (a) efficiency and equity, (b) growth and distribution, (c) recent changes in 
inequality, (d) recent work on the complex patterns of inequality change in developing countries, and (e) inequality 
between countries. All of these different strands of analyses have ensured that inequality will be prominent on the 
development agenda in the decade to come. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the tum of the century discussion of inequality, and distribution more 
generally, has come to the fore in the development discourse, after a period of relative 
neglect in the 1980s. This is true not just of the development discourse, but the discourse 
on economic policy more generally. Atkinson (1997) writes of "Bringing Income 
Distribution in from the Cold." A Handbook on Income Distribution, the first ever, will 
come out this year. In their introduction to this volume, Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1998) write: "There was a time in the postwar period when interest in the distribution of 
income had almost vanished....Today, the position is different." 
The object of this paper is to trace some of the contours of this resurgence of interest 
in distribution in the development discourse. In Section 2 we argue that the profession 
wide debate on the separation of efficiency and equity has had its impact on the 
development literature, where the analysis now focuses on whether and under what 
conditions they are substitutes or complements. Section 3 turns to the role of the Kuznets 
curve in the rise and fall of interest in distribution. Section 4 looks at changes III 
inequality between the 1980s and the 1990s to see if the resurgence of interest III 
inequality can be found in these facts. Section 5 introduces a literature and a type of 
analysis which is going to become common in the development literature as more 
household surveys become available-analysis which highlights the complex micro­
patterns of distributional change in developing countries, even when overall indices of 
inequality do not change very much. Section 6 considers the question of inequality 
between countries. Section 7 concludes the paper by noting that the trends we have 
identified look set to keep inequality at the forefront of the development agenda in the 
years to come. 
-
... 
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2. EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
 
One strand of literature which speaks to the question of why inequality is now back 
on the agenda, is welfare economics. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics 
give precise form to Adam Smith's invisible hand. The first theorem says that any 
equilibrium in competitive markets is Pareto efficient; the second that, under certain 
conditions, any Pareto efficient allocation can be attained as a competitive equilibrium. 
There is thus a tight connection between market equilibrium allocations and efficiency. 
But what about distribution? One of the conditions for the second theorem is the 
availability of lump sum transfers through which endowments can be redistributed. Since 
any Pareto efficient outcome can be described as an equilibrium of perfectly competitive 
markets, these outcomes can be egalitarian or non-egalitarian ones. The key point is that, 
within this framework, efficiency and equity are separable. The policy counterpart of this 
intellectual framework was present, for example, in arguments to redistribute via assets 
while keeping markets as free and as competitive as possible. A lucid account of this 
debate is to be found in Meade (1964). 
The framework developed by Arrow and Debreu and their followers, which 
describes the precise conditions under which the invisible hand did its work, was refined 
and sharpened in the first decades after the war. But such precision only served to 
highlight the severity of the conditions required-no increasing returns, no monopolies, a 
complete set of markets for present and future goods, complete insurance markets, fully 
available and symmetric information, lump sum transfer instruments, etc. In the 1970s 
and the 1980s, the reaction set in and a number of economists began relaxing these 
assumptions. For example, Joseph Stiglitz, George Akerlof, Michael Spence and others 
took the implications of imperfect information head on. This line of research questioned 
the efficiency ofmarket equilibrium. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), for example, showed 
-
that in the presence of imperfect information the competitive equilibrium was not even 
constrained Pareto efficient. 
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Much of the literature in this vein is devoted to showing features of equilibria under 
conditions that approximate reality better than the Arrow-Debreu model, or 
demonstrating inefficiency of market equilibria. However, there is one strand which is 
particularly relevant for us. This focuses on the separation of efficiency and equity and 
shows that, once the Arrow-Debreu conditions are relaxed, there is no such separation. 
With imperfect information, lump sum redistribution of endowments have the capacity to 
improve efficiency (in the sense of making at least one person better off without making 
anyone else worse off) under certain conditions, or worsen it under others (Hoff 1994). In 
the absence of lump sum instruments, market interventions may reduce efficiency, but 
improve equity. In any event, whether they are substitutes or complements, efficiency 
and equity have to be taken together-they are not separable. 
This non-separability has been analyzed in detail in a growmg number of 
contributions and we note some strands in the literature. One strand goes back to the 
Noble prize winning paper of Mirrlees (1971), where lack of lump sum transfers 
instruments makes equity and efficiency substitutes. Mirrlees (1971) models the classic 
conflict between progressive income taxation and the incentives to provide effort. He 
shows that the resolution depends on a combination of the degree of egalitarianism and 
the characteristics of labor supply. The large literature which followed Mirrlees's 
contribution (see the appreciation in Dixit and Besley 1997) helped us understand better 
the nature of this tradeoff. 
Yet another strand in the literature emphasizes the complementarity between 
equity and efficiency. Boadway and Keen (1999) survey the literature and provide an 
excellent account of the underlying economics in the following illustration from capital 
markets: 
"Lenders' informationally-constrained responses to the possibilities that 
­
borrowers will default on their loans or simply abscond with the funds, are likely to lead 
to levels of investment that depart from the first best. Differing models give different 
predictions as to whether there will be under- or over- investment: lenders may ration 
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investments below the first best, for example, or borrowers may borrow excessively to 
take advantage of being able to default if things go badly. In either event, however, a 
redistribution of wealth towards borrowers is likely to move investment closer to the first 
best, so increasing aggregate income: incentive problems will be mitigated in so far as 
greater wealth enables (or obliges) investors to rely more heavily on their own funds 
rather than borrowed funds tainted with the lender's mistrust." 
Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (1999) also review and elaborate on a large and 
growing literature in this vein, looking explicitly at other issues such as common property 
resource problems, and socially optimal levels of risk taking. They find 
complementarities as well as tradeoffs, but end with the basic conclusion that distribution 
and efficiency are inextricable. Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Pefialosa (1999) also review 
the literature and on balance find more evidence for a positive relationship between 
equality and growth. 
Once the conditions giving rise to the separability of efficiency and equity are 
abandoned, much depends on the detail of the situation at hand, and very different results 
can be obtained with different specifications. To illustrate this, consider a famous debate 
of the 1980s, that on "Adjustment and Equity", and let us focus on Africa. It will be 
recalled that the macro shocks of the late 1970s revealed major weaknesses in African 
economies, particularly on the trade front. Dramatically overvalued exchange rates and a 
plethora of trade controls, it was argued, were highly inefficient distortions which needed 
to be removed during the process of stabilization and adjustment. But what about the 
ditstributional consequences of this adjustment (setting to one side the stabilization 
phase)? 
It was argued by some that these consequences would be benign. One such 
argument is to be found in Kanbur (1987). The analysis proceeds from a stylized 
... 
characterization of the adjustment as increasing the returns to activities producing 
internationally tradable goods and services relative to activities producing non-tradable 
goods and services. The issue then became who (in the short run) derived their income 
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primarily from the tradable sector and which factor (in the long run) was used more 
intensively in this sector. Empirical evidence (Kanbur 1990) was used to argue that on 
both these counts the outcomes were likely to be more equitable than the status quo­
essentially, households engaged in the tradable sector (for example, small holder, export 
cash crop farmers in West Africa) were poorer on average than those in the more 
urbanized non-tradable sector. 
All of this was analysis of distribution at the household level-mainstream 
economic analysis, and empirical data collection, rarely went into intrahousehold issues 
in the mid 1980s. However, during the last fifteen years there has been considerable work 
on gender division within the household (for a review, see Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, 
Hoddinott and Kanbur 1995). Following on from the pioneering work of Sen (1983), 
intrahousehold inequality is treated much more systematically now in the mainstream 
development economics literature. For example, Haddad and Kanbur (1990) showed how 
taking this into account can dramatically alter the measurement of inequality and poverty. 
Moreover, an intrahousehold and gender perspective also may change the analysis of 
adjustment and equity. For example, if there is gender segmentation in production, if 
there is not complete pooling of household resources, and if women derive their income 
primarily from non-tradable goods and services, then the sort of adjustment analyzed 
above may well worsen distribution by negatively affecting women compared to men 
(Kanbur and Haddad 1994) and this may well explain why some of the most vocal 
complaints against "adjustment" have come from Women's groups in developing 
countries. 
To summarize, our argument is that one of the reasons inequality is back on the 
agenda is that the last two decades have culminated in a triumph of the imperfect 
information and imperfect markets perspective in mainstream economics. As noted 
above, one consequence of this is that distribution becomes an integral part of the overall 
­
analysis of economic performance, not an add-on to be considered once efficiency has 
been established. But what it also means is that a detailed, case by case, analysis is 
needed to determine whether distribution and allocative efficiency are substitutes or 
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complements. Either way, it puts inequality back on the agenda of the development 
discourse. 
3. GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION 
A second strand of the literature we would like to refer to, one which is more 
directly related to the development economics literature, is that on growth and 
distribution. This literature has gone through interesting cycles in the post war period (see 
Kanbur 1998). Immediately before and after the second world war, the concern was with 
demand management and then with overall growth. Thus, for example, Rosenstein­
Rodan's (1943) analysis of development problems focuses entirely on industrialization 
and growth, not on the distribution of this growth. The development and growth models 
of that time (Mahalanobis 1963) mostly have this characteristic. However, by the mid 
1950s a change was already taking place, as evidenced in the classic contributions of 
Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955). As the opening sections of Lewis's Nobel prize 
winning paper make clear, he self-consciously saw himself as reviving a "classical 
tradition" which he lamented had fallen into disuse, where growth and distribution were 
organically connected-the evolution of one was intimately tied to the evolution of the 
other (as Ricardo noted-"To determine the laws which regulate this distribution is the 
principal problem in political economy"). The distribution Lewis emphasized, true to his 
classical inspiration, was that between capital and labor, and he showed how this 
distribution affected savings, accumulation ofcapital and hence growth. 
Kuznets's (1955) celebrated paper was concerned with the personal distribution of 
income and launched the famous inverted U hypothesis-as development proceeds and 
per capita income increases, inequality first increases and then decreases. The simple 
model of intersectoral population shifts can be elaborated upon (see Anand and Kanbur 
1993a), but the basic point is that growth and equity were no longer independent in this 
model-they were substitutes to start with, and then complements once the turning point ­
of the inverted-U was reached. In a widely cited paper, Ahluwalia (1976) claimed 
moreover to have empirical support for the inverted-U using data on a cross section of 
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developing and developed countries. It is interesting to see the widely differing policy 
conclusions that could be drawn from this framework. To some, the relationship meant 
that there was sharp conflict between growth and equity (Fishlow 1972), something to be 
managed. To others, the eventual turning point counseled fast growth-to get over the 
hump and into the decreasing inequality range as quickly as possible. But notice that for 
both positions, growth and distribution were inseparably joined. The need to manage the 
distributional consequences of growth is aptly illustrated in the title of the book which 
many would argue to be the culmination of this strand of thinking, "Redistribution with 
Growth," (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Bell; Duloy, Jolly 1974). 
And yet, in the 1980s the pendulum swung again, and growth and distribution 
were separated from each other. But the literature in this phase was different in kind to 
that of the immediate post war period. One of the main reasons was that empirical 
support for the Kuznets relationship proved to be weak. Using the very same data set on 
which Ahluwalia (1976) was baselL Anand and Kanbur (1993b) argued that there was in 
fact no empirical relationship to be seen once a clean data set and appropriate 
econometric techniques were applied. This finding has now been confirmed by 
researchers on a greatly expanded data set compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996). In 
fact, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) argue that inequality does not change very much at all in 
countries over time (and a fortiori, since per capita incomes do change considerably, 
there is no systematic relationship between inequality and per capita income for countries 
over time). 
It is interesting to focus for a moment on what policy implications might be drawn 
from the new conventional wisdom that inequality does not change very much as per 
capita income increases. One example of such a policy inference is in World Bank 
(1998): 
-

"One study examined trends in the distribution of income for 45 countries for 
which high quality household income or expenditure data are available over time (Li, 
Squire and Zou 1998). In 29 countries there has been no trend in either direction. The 
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remammg 16 countries are divided: 8 have shown rising inequality, 8 declining. If 
income distribution does not change much over time, the gains in per capita income will 
affect different segments of society to about the same degree. Thus, in countries with 
rapid growth, incomes of the poorest will rise rapidly and the incidence of poverty will 
decline. But in countries with no per capita growth and a stable income distribution, there 
will be no poverty reduction." 
It is worth examining this logic closely. What it seems to be saying is that going 
for growth can be pursued without fear of increased inequality because there is no 
systematic relationship between inequality change and growth. But the latter is a 
statement about a reduced form relationship between per capita income and income 
distribution, and that too about lack of correlation on average (Bruno, Ravallion and 
Squire 1998, warn that the average can and does hide large differences between 
countries). In any event, the reduced form relationship cannot give policy guidance since 
the instruments which influence growth may also influence distribution. Of course there 
is a combination of policy instruments that could replicate the "growth but no distribution 
change" scenario seen in the outcomes for various countries. But what is that 
combination? To this question, such analysis cannot give an answer. In fact, it can be 
argued that such analysis is dangerous because it leads to an easy leap to a stylized 
assumption that, since growth is distribution neutral in the reduced form, the same is true 
in the structural form. In other words, those policy instruments which lead to growth are 
also distribution neutral. Recent work by Lundberg and Squire (1999) shows how 
individual policy instruments can be highly distributionally non-neutral, even though 
some combination of them could of course lead to distribution neutral growth.2 
There is another type of analysis which risks falling into a similar trap, and this is 
the "decomposition" of poverty change into a "growth" component and a redistribution 
component. The analytics of this are laid in Datt and Ravallion, 1992 (see also Ravallion 
1999, for a comparison with Kakwani 1994). The exercise is conducted as follows. We ­
2 See also the recent work of Gallup, Radelet and Warner (1999) for a more structural approach to 
distributional change. 
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have two income distributions, say for periods t and t+1. These will differ, in general, in 
their means and in their inequality. They will also, in general, have different values of 
any given poverty index (like the head count ratio), P(t) and P(t+1). The exercise then 
constructs a synthetic intermediate distribution * which has the mean of the t+1 
distribution but the spread of the t distribution (there are different technical ways of doing 
this, and there are issues of "path dependence" and the "residual" but the basic idea 
should be clear). This synthetic distribution * also has a poverty number P(*) associated 
with it. Then, the change from P(t) to P(*) is referred to as the "growth component" of 
the overall poverty change between the two periods, and the change from P(*) to P(t+1) 
as the "redistribution component". Typically, the first component accounts for as much as 
80% of the overall change. 
Now, the above calculations are perfectly acceptable as an accounting exercise­
they represent an interesting initial way of organizing and presenting the evolution of 
income distribution. But their cutting power, and their potential danger, in policy analysis 
comes from a leap to an implicit separability of policy instruments between the two 
components-that, somehow, the growth component could be accomplished throughout a 
set of policy instruments independently of the redistribution component. Careful 
researchers warn against going beyond the accounting nature of the exercise (Ravallion 
1999), but there is a danger of an easy slip into a classification of policy instruments into 
"growth" instruments (lower tariffs, higher FDI, privatizing SOEs) and "redistribution" 
instruments (food subsidies, labor based public works, progressive taxation). And yet, it 
is now clear that there is no justification in economic theory for such a separation. 
Moreover, it should be clear that many if not most individual policy instruments have 
both growth and distributional consequences (see Lundberg and Squire 1999, for 
evidence on this front). Of course, there are combinations of instruments which can 
produce distribution neutral growth, but to find out this combination (which will vary 
from case to case) requires, among other things, a distribution sensitive analysis of each 
­
of the instruments. 
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Finally, a large and growing literature in the last decade and a half has explored 
the connections between growth and distribution through an investigation of a possible 
causal link between initial inequality and subsequent growth. This literature has brought 
together recently developed models of endogenous growth, with an earlier generation of 
models of credit and other market failures, and also incorporated insights of the new 
political economy. This is a large literature (see Aghion, Caroli, Garcia-Pefialosa 1999, 
Benabou 1996, Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire 1998, Kanbur 1998, Ravallion 1997), but 
some flavor of it can be found in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), for example. Here output 
depends on capital, labor and a public good. The public good is financed through a 
proportional tax and, given the endogenous growth specification, steady state growth 
depends on this tax rate. Individuals differ in their endowments and hence have different 
interests-the common tax rate delivers a common benefit through expenditure on the 
public good, but its costs are paid for by those with higher endowments. These differing 
interests will be resolved through the political economy institutions. With majority voting 
the median voter theorem can be invoked under certain conditions-as the ratio of 
median to mean wealth rises, that is as the measure of inequality decreases, the voted for 
tax rate will be lower and hence growth rate will be higher. It has to be said that the jury 
is still out on whether empirically there is a positive or negative causal link from 
inequality to growth (Fishlow 1995 and Forbes 1998). Ros (1998), for example, argues 
that different types of inequality (for example, wage inequality versus asset inequality) 
affect growth differently and reduced-from regressions cannot capture these differences. 
What is clear, however, is that the assumption of independence between growth and 
distribution needs to be questioned seriously. 
In the growth and distribution literature, much has been made of the empirical 
regularity of a lack of systematic correlation between per capita income and inequality at 
the aggregate level, which is sometimes used as the basis for separating out growth and 
redistribution in policy discourse. But, as we have argued, such reduced fonn 
-
relationships have little to say on policy instruments, and what is needed is empirical 
work on the distributional consequences of specific policy instruments. Such work is now 
under way and it will be illustrated with specific country studies in Section 5. The key 
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then is to find combinations of instruments that will deliver both growth and equity and, 
in this task, inequality is clearly back on the agenda. 3 
4. RECENT CHANGES IN INCOME INEQUALITY 
Can at least some of the recent revival of interest in distribution be attributed to 
the brute facts of inequality change between the last two decades? In table 1 we can 
observe the Gini coefficients for all countries for which "reliable" data points spanning 
the last decade are available.4 One result that becomes immediately apparent is that, 
while rising inequality is by no means the norm, there have been very sharp upward 
movements in a number of countries. In eleven countries shown in the table, the Gini 
coefficient has increased between five and nine percentage points; in seven countries, 
between ten and nineteen percentage points; and in two countries, by more that twenty (!) 
percentage points. These changes occurred in a span of a decade or less. Clearly, 
monitoring the evolution of the Gini coefficient is no longer as unexciting as "watching 
the grass grow."s 
While it is true that practically all of the large increases (5 percentage points or 
more) occurred in transition economies, upward movements are witnessed in countries 
with very different structural characteristics. Inequality has risen in countries that were 
traditionally more egalitarian (Thailand, for example) or very unequal (Mexico, for 
example); in advanced nations (the United States and the UK, for example) and in poor 
countries alike (Panama and Ethiopia, for example); and, in long-standing market 
economies (Hong Kong, for example) or countries in transition (China and Russia, for 
example). The other important fact is that there is no systematic relationship between the 
evolution of inequality and growth performance: output growth was positive in 16 of the 
3 See, for example, Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995). 
4 We put "reliable" in quotations because, in general, available inequality measures for a particular country 
do not necessarily provide an accurate description of the country's degree of inequality. One source of the ­
problem is the underreporting of income (and expenditures) that occurs more frequently at the lower and 
higher ends of the income spectrum. As a result, an inequality measure for the same country, using the 
same survey and for the same year can vary by several percentage points depending on whether the data on 
income was corrected for underreporting and on the method followed to do the correction. For an 
illustration of this see Lustig and Szekely'S (1998) paper on Mexico. 
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37 countries where inequality increased and in 9 of the 14 countries where inequality 
declined. Inequality has risen in both expanding economies (for example, Australia) and 
stagnant ones (for example, Lithuania). As shown in Figure 1, there is no systematic 
relationship between trends in inequality and growth. 
Observers and analysts have attempted to explain the increases in inequality as 
stemming from the same global forces of skilled-biased technological change and, 
particularly for the higher income countries, of increased trade with cheap countries 
whose abundant factor is unskilled (cheap) labor. However, an equally important result 
observed in table 1 is that for a very large number of equally diverse countries inequality 
has remained practically unchanged (Colombia, India, Japan, Morocco, and Sweden, for 
example) and it has even fallen in a few (for example, Bangladesh, Canada, Honduras 
and Tunisia). What accounts for the difference in outcomes? 
A. B. Atkinson (1998) addresses this question for the case of advanced 
industrialized countries. Noting that the latter featured a divergent pattern in income 
inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s, he posits that in addition to differences in 
government policies, social norms may have played a role.6 While the Gini coefficient 
rose by more than 40 percent in the U.K., over 10 percent in Japan and Germany (in the 
early nineties), and close to 10 percent in the United States, it fell slightly for Canada, 
and more pronouncedly for Italy, and, particularly, France.? One fact in support of this 
sociological theory of the determination of labor remuneration is that all the countries (in 
Atkinson's study) for which the Gini rose were governed by center-right or outward 
rightwing governments while those for which the Gini declined were governed by center­
left social democratic government. The question that remains is the nature of the 
causality. Did countries with more egalitarian social norms vote for more leftist 
5 To quote Henry Aaron (1978). ­
6 It is better to not refer to them as OEeD countries since the "club" now includes NIC's such as Mexico, 
South Korea and Turkey. 
7 France is quite remarkable in this respect. With a Gini of Latin American standards-that is, close to .5-­
in the early 1960s, it fell to .35 in the rnid-1980s and it continued to decline afterwards through the end of 
the decade. Data for the 1990s, however, is not available. 
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governments? Or, once the more right-wing governments were voted in, did inequality 
increase as a result of the influence on social norms by non-egalitarian leaders? 
In the case of the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, it is conceivable that government policy made an important difference. One 
interesting fact is that in three out of the only four countries where income inequality 
practically did not change between the period right before and the years immediately 
after the dismantling of the Communist regime, the governments pursued what Milanovic 
(1998) called "populist" policies. In Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, the Gini for 1993-95 
hovered around levels below .25, and they are among the most egalitarian countries of the 
previous Soviet bloc.8 In these countries wages, cash social transfers and non-wage 
private income rose. Furthermore, while wage inequality contributed to increase 
inequality, the cash social transfers were equalizing. Milanovic argues that in those 
countries the governments attempted to cushion the population from the sharp 
contractions in GDP. On the other end, the countries that saw the sharpest increases in 
inequality such as Russia and the Ukraine were under governments which Milanovic calls 
"non-compensators.,,9 Nonetheless, it is important to note that not all countries with such 
. governments experienced the sharp increases in inequality observed in those two. 
In the end, the answer to the question of why outcomes are so different in countries 
that in appearance have similar structural characteristics and are subject to similar global 
forces may lie in the following explanation. The size distribution of income is the result 
of a number of complex forces which sometimes move in the same direction but 
sometimes countervail each other even to the point that their effects cancel each other 
out. Some of these forces stem from the evolution of the distribution of endowments and 
their market returns; the latter, in tum, are affected by trends in technology, openness, 
and decisions affecting the rate of labor market participation and occupational choice. 
Other forces are related to family formation decisions such as the choice of partner and 
the number of children. Yet other forces are related to tax and transfer policy and how it 
8 Inequality in Poland began to rise after 1992 which is why Poland appears among the countries with
 
rising inequality in table 2. .
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affects after-tax income levels (or what is sometimes called "unearned" income). A closer 
examination at these various forces and how they reinforce or counteract each other shall 
be the topic of our next section. 
5. THE COMPLEX PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY CHANGE 
We wish to argue that one of the reasons why inequality is back on the agenda is that 
in recent years, based on increasingly more widely available time series of household 
surveys for developing countries, analysts have gone beneath the surface of the overall 
Gini coefficient to explore the micro structures of inequality evolution. Such detailed 
investigations have revealed interesting insights into income distribution processes, and 
have raised issues about alternative entry points for policy. In this section we illustrate 
the~e new developments with specific case studies. 
In what follows we shall highlight how changes in returns, endowments, preferences 
and policy may contribute to the evolution of the size distribution of income by drawing 
on three case studies: Brazil, Mexico and Taiwan. All three studies use the micro­
simulation decomposition methodology proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand 
(1998) for Taiwan. Briefly, this methodology decomposes the observed trends in the 
distribution of income in returns or price effects, endowment effects, labor participation 
and occupational choice effects, and --whenever data permits-- unearned income effects. 
Its advantage over other existing decomposition methodologies is that it allows one to 
simulate changes on the entire distribution. Second, it provides a much richer texture of 
the forces behind observed trends in inequality than the standard group decomposition or 
decomposition by source exercises. to 
BRAZIL 
Using the Theil index, Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1998) find that household per 
capita income inequality in urban Brazil fell from 0.88 in 1976 to 0.68 in 1996 (the Gini 
9 For work on Russia see also Commander and Lee (1998).
 
10 For a detailed description of this method and its application see the proposal by Bourguignon, Ferreira
 
and Lustig (1997).
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fell from 0.62 to 0.59 over the same period). However, the authors found that ­
controlling for age and gender - the earnings-education profile for both wage-earners and 
self-employed workers became substantially more convex over that period, implying an 
increase in the returns to education over most pairwise comparisons. This places Brazil in 
the same category as many other places -including Taiwan and Mexico - where steeper 
returns to education were also observed. The returns to experience (measured by age) 
were essentially unchanged. There was a reduction in the gender earnings gap (as 
measured by the 'returns to being male') for both types of worker, but simulations 
indicate that this effect was not sufficient to outweigh the dispersion-increasing effect of 
a steeper earnings-education profile. Overall, then, the returns or price effects were 
unegualizing. 
How can this be reconciled with the decline in inequality actually observed? 
Applying the Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1999) methodology, the authors find that 
there are three main equalizing factors at work in Brazil over the period which, together, 
more than offset the unequalizing effect of increasing returns to education. The first was 
changes in the educational composition of the population. As the average years of 
schooling of Brazilians rose from 3.8 to 5.9 over the perio~ the simulated effect of 
changes in educational endowments on both the individual earnings distribution and on 
that of household per capita incomes was egualizing. The second effect was demographic 
in nature, and can be seen - at least in part _. as a secondary effect of the rightward shift 
in the distribution of education: higher levels of schooling (particularly for women) 
contributed to a noticeable reduction in family sizes (largely through a decline in the 
number of children). The average household size declined from 4.3 to 3.5 persons, and 
the dependency ratio also fell. This decline was more pronounced for poorer households, 
leading to a disproportionate relative increase in their per capita incomes and a reduction 
in inequality. 
-
The third effect was a reduction in the vanance of returns to 'unobserved' 
characteristics, which include skills unrelated to education, regional location, race, and 
the firm size in which one works. This effect suggests a reduction in the degree of 
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segmentation in the Brazilian labor market during the 1976 to 1996 period, as well as a 
possible decline in regional inequalities. These trends are compatible with some of the 
earlier evidence from both static and dynamic decompositions of scalar inequality 
measures, reported by Ferreira and Litchfield (1998). They also highlight the continuing 
importance of investigating the evolution of discrimination and segmentation in the 
Brazilian labor market in a more systematic way. 
MEXICO 
Income inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 1994: the Gini 
coefficient increased from .491 to .549, respectively. I I As the Lorenz curves present no 
crossings, the increase is unambiguous. 12 Applying the micro-simulation decomposition 
methodology referred to above, Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (1998) attempt to identify 
which factors lie behind the rise in inequality using a reduced-form household income 
regression model. The results of this exercise revealed that the widening gap in the 
"returns" to education explain close to fifty percent of the observed increase in inequality, 
while the "returns" to regional location around 24 percent with the South alone 
accounting for 15 percent of the latter. 13 Hence, most of the rising inequality in Mexico 
should be ascribed to increasing disparities in returns. Endowment effects-that is, the 
distribution of skills, etc.-account for about a fourth of the increase in inequality. In 
contrast to the case of Brazil (above) and Taiwan (below), the unequalizing effect of the 
widening gap in the returns to skill was not compensated by a more equal distribution of 
(observable and unobservable) skills. 
Several explanations have been put forward to account for the observed sharp 
increase in the returns to education. One revolves around institutional changes in the 
labor market such as reductions in the minimum wage, the decreasing strength of trade 
unions, and the declining share of state-owned enterprises. However, the distribution of 
11 Bouillon, Legovini and Lustig (1999), Figure 1. The rise in inequality is robust to the inequality measure ... 
and to adjustments to income to account for economies of scale in the household and underreporting. 
12 Lustig and Szekely (1998). ..­
13Because the decomposition method is applied to a reduced form household income model, strictly 
speaking the estimated coefficients are not returns. They capture not only the market returns to the 
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the real wages, for example, does not reveal any truncation around the minimum wage, 
which suggests that the latter was not binding during the period under consideration.14 In 
addition, there is no evidence that the distribution of union wages is significantly 
different from non-union wages, once differences in education levels are accounted for. 
However, the average wages for unionized workers relative to those for non-unionized 
workers declined over the periodl5 , a trend that should make the distribution of wage 
income more equal. 
The other.explanation for the rising returns to education is that the demand for 
labor has become more skill-biased. Using Mexico's employment surveys, Cragg and 
Epelbaum (1995) concluded that the increase in wage inequality can be attributed to the 
rapid increase in wages for more educated and experienced workers, while the wage 
increase was minimal among less skilled workers. The authors concluded that this trend 
is caused by a shift in demand, skewed in favor of higher skills more than a uniform 
increase in demand faced with different elasticities of labor supply by skill. 
The skill(education)-biased shift in demand for labor could be the result of several 
factors. Two in particular have been analyzed in the literature: trade liberalization and 
technical change. Hanson and Harrison (1995), for example, found that 23 percent of the 
increase in relative wages for skilled workers during the period 1986-1990 could be 
attributed to the reduction in tariffs and the elimination of import license requirements. 
Revenga (1995) finds that reductions in import quota coverage and tariff levels were 
associated with moderate falls in firm-level employment. Revenga's analysis suggests 
that there has been a slight shift in the skill mix in favor of skilled labor (non-production 
workers in her sample). It also indicates that employment and wages for unskilled labor 
(production workers in her sample) are significantly more responsive to reductions in 
protection levels, which the author attributes to the fact that unskilled workers were more 
heavily concentrated in industries that underwent large reductions in protection. 
-

corresponding characteristics but also a whole range of endogenous decisions such as labor force
 
participation and occupational choice.
 
14 Uchler (1997), p. 7.
 
15 GEeD Economic Surveys 1996-1997: Mexico
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Tan and Batra (1997) find that investments in technology as measured by 
investments in research and development and labor training, as well as export-orientation 
have a large impact on the size-wage distributions for skilled workers and a relatively 
smaller effect on wages paid to the unskilled. For them, this asymmetric impact of 
technology is consistent with skill-biased technical change. This view is supported by the 
fact that there is evidence that in Mexico foreign-owned exporting enterprises, which 
operate in the most export-oriented sectors, and those that use technology of other 
enterprises pay higher wages to skilled workers. As these enterprises are in a more 
favorable competitive position in the world economy, they have potential to increase 
production and increase in numbers as the integration process progresses and 
consolidates, especially in connection with the Free Trade Agreement. Even if Mexico 
invests in educational and training institutions, it may not be able to do it at a pace 
sufficiently rapid to counter the trends in labor demand. Demand and remuneration for 
skilled workers might thus continue to rise, and accordingly, the wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled labor might widen even further. 
TAIWAN 
Taiwan is noted for having a low and stable level of inequality. The Gini 
coefficient, for example, hovered around .30 for approximately the past thirty years. A 
closer look at the evolution of income distribution, however, reveals that this is by no 
means the result of the absence of changes in earning patterns, demographic structure, or 
labor choices. On the contrary, it is the outcome of a number of complex forces with 
often opposing effects but which ended up compensating each other to the point that the 
net effect was almost imperceptible. 16 
While it is true that overall inequality practically did not change, the distribution 
of primary (before taxes and transfers) adult equivalent income became more unequal, 
implying that government policy was effective at countervailing other forces. On the ... 
16 The results discussed here are from the study of Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (1998). 
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other hand, the distribution of income of individual earnings became more equal. Does 
this mean that Taiwan was spared from the widening gap in returns to education observed 
in many other countries? If not, what forces operated to compensate what in other 
countries has been at the bottom of rising overall inequality? What factors have been at 
play to make the distribution of primary income more unequal in spite of lower earnings 
inequality? 
In their study, Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (1998) find that Taiwan has 
experienced the same trend in rising returns to education at the higher end relative to 
other levels as it has been for countries throughout the world. Interestingly, this occurred 
despite of the incredibly rapid expansion in the supply of labor with more years of 
education. For example, average years of schooling in Taiwan increased from 6 to 9.5 
years between 1970 and 1995. However, the unequalizing effect on the distribution of 
earnings implied by higher returns to education was more than offset by three other 
factors in order of importance: i. a decline in the variance of unobserved characteristics; 
ii. a change in the level and distribution of schooling among wage earners; and, iii. the 
fact that more women chose to participate in the labor force and some men dropped out. 
Because of the initial gap in earnings between men and women, these changes in labor 
force participation were equalizing. The net result of all these forces was a lower 
ineguality in the distribution of individual earnings. 
At the level of the household-that is, when earners were paired with other 
earners, or earnings were paired with other sources of income--the result was that overall 
primary (adult equivalent) income inequality increased over time. One interesting 
observation is that changes in labor force participation and occupational choice were 
unequalizing. This is the result of two phenomena. First, the negative effect of the 
husband's income on married women's participation in the labor force weakened over 
time: that is, more women married to higher income earners chose to participate in the 
-
labor force compared to the past. Also, while the fact that women entering the labor force 
were more educated had an equalizing effect on the distribution of earnings, this trend 
made the distribution of household income more unequal at the level of the household. 
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This is so because better educated women tend to live in households with higher incomes 
to begin with. On the other hand, the equalizing effect of the expansion of education was 
weaker at the household level because of its negative impact on labor force participation 
of younger cohorts, particularly those coming from the lower end of the income 
spectrum. 
What the three studies reveal is that behind apparently straightforward trends, 
there are major structural forces at play. Some of these forces can be directly affected by 
policy, such as the average schooling and the distribution of the stock education-but it 
takes time--. Other forces are strictly market outcomes or stem from individual 
preferences in terms of labor force participation and the choice of partner or the number 
and spacing of children. The influence of policy measures on the latter is likely to be 
more ambiguous. Finally, it is important to mention once more that as the case of Taiwan 
has shown, tax and transfer policies can counteract the observed increases in primary 
income inequality. 
6. INEQUALITY BETWEEN COUNTRIES 
The final reason we consider for why inequality is back on the agenda is the 
evolution of inequality between countries. At a very simple level, in table 2 we present 
the coefficient of variation of per capita GDP across countries since 1980. By this 
measure it can be observed that inequality across nations has been steadily on the rise. 
Milanovic (1999) also finds that world Gini coefficient rose from 62.8 to 66.7 between 
1988 and 1993 and that the bulk of the increase has been accounted by the "between­
country" component. This widening gap, seen in the historical context, has led to a 
burgeoning literature which has, at least indirectly, put inequality back on the agenda. 
If the world behaved as predicted by the simple neoclassical growth model, the 
.. per capita incomes of countries with the same preferences (that is saving rate), 
technologies, government policies, and population growth, would eventually converge. 
This framework implies that the differences in the countries' income per capita could be 
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explained in full by differences in steady state income per capita and by how far they are 
from their steady state equilibrium. Initial conditions do not matter and transitory shocks 
do not alter the long run equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the world is characterized by 
multiple, locally stable, equilibria, convergence may not ensue. Different initial 
conditions or transitory shocks could push countries with even the same preferences, 
technologies, etc., into permanently different long term equilibria. 
Whichever model is correct, the question is why are some countries kept in the 
low-income club, and can something be done to reverse this? Although no clear 
consensus has emerged whether conditional convergence is validated by the empirical 
analysis, there is enough evidence in support of the view that the world seems to be 
converging towards two clubs: the rich and the poor countries. 17 More precisely, a sort of 
conditional convergence-that is, an inverse relationship between output per capita 
growth and income per capita level--appears to apply to countries with incomes per 
worker above the world average. In contrast, those on the opposite end of the spectrum 
seem caught in a "poverty trap." Historically, there has been massive divergence in 
absolute and relative per capita incomes with steady and nearly equal growth rates for the 
leaders in the long run while the currently poor countries always had low growth rates. 18 
This phenomenon explains the difficulty of finding strong tendencies towards divergence 
or convergence for the whole sample of countries. 19 
A number of explanations have been put forward in the literature as to why slow 
growth can persist at low income levels. In the extensions of the simple neoclassical 
framework this could reflect differences in steady state equilibrium resulting from low 
investments in human capital and political instability.2o It could also be the result of a 
protracted transition due to a series of large adverse external shocks. Ros (1998) tries to 
17 On the formation of a two-club world see Quah (1993), Ros (1998).
 
18 Pritchett (1997). 
­19 Of course, the observed patterns in the relationship between growth and income per capita may be
 
reflecting gaps across countries in their position vis-a-vis their steady state. The simple neoclassical ..
 
framework is perfectly consistent with a country which is closer to its low steady state income per capita
 
level may grow more slowly than a richer country which is much further away from its steady state
 
equilibrium.
 
20 Barro (1991,1997); Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
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address this issue by grouping the sample of countries used in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) in growth performance categories, and estimating their steady state incomes per 
capita. Subsequently, the relative position of countries in their steady states is compared 
with the actual income gaps. Since the former are much narrower than the latter, the 
differences would seem to arise from the fact that poorer countries are further away from 
their steady state. However, this would imply-according to the neoclassical model-that 
the poorer countries should be growing faster, something that is not validated by their 
actual performance. (Ros 1998) 
Although this exercise is not conclusive, it does support the view that economic 
growth may be better characterized by multiple equilibria: that is, a world were initial 
conditions matter and transitional shocks have long-run implications. In such a world, 
poverty traps stem from countries being pushed-by either initial conditions or shocks­
into a low-level equilibrium. In the development literature, particularly in the early one, 
several simple models of low-level equilibrium traps were put forward. One is the 
insufficient savings theory first introduced by Leibenstein (1957) and subsequently 
formalized by King and Rebelo (1993). The scenario predicted by this approach is that at 
low levels of the capital-labor ratio income per capita is barely enough for subsistence, 
and savings fall below depreciation. The country is "stuck" in a low-level equilibrium 
trap. Thus, although the country may be filled with good investment opportunities, it is 
too poor to take advantage of them. Foreign investment or foreign aid would take care of 
such a problem, though. The only factor that could counter this, then, would be political 
risk (deterring private capital flows) or international misbehavior (deterring foreign aid). 
As mentioned above, Barro (1991, 1997) finds that when in addition to controlling for 
human capital differences, one controls for the role of political risk, convergence-albeit 
slow-seems to ensue. Ros (1998), however, finds an interesting result: if countries are 
classified by income level, at the low end of the spectrum, differences in the rule of law 
index (used by Barro) appear too small compared with the large differences in growth 
rates observed among the countries in this group. 
..
i 
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There are many ways in which the debate on the seemingly inexorable growth of 
inequality between countries is impinging on the development discourse. In fact, the 
multiple equilibria and club convergence perspectives do have strong implication for 
policy. The club convergence view gives credence to the view that policy matters, that a 
country's evolution is not preordained but can be altered by intervention-which leads to 
the far from resolved debate on what exactly these interventions ought to be. In so far as 
initial conditions include low levels of physical and human capital, these perspective also 
support the arguments for foreign aid to help poor countries break out of their low level 
traps. 
The most recent literature on aid, however, has thrown doubts on the historical 
record of aid in actually helping poorer countries to grow. Burnside and Dollar (1997) 
and World Bank (1998), and a host of other recent writings (for example Kanbur 1999) 
point to the dismal record of aid in breaking the poverty traps identified in the growth 
literature. The reason, it would seem, is that resources by themselves are not enough. 
How they are used is crucial. Burnside and Dollar (1997) show that aid promotes growth 
only when it flows into "good" policy environments--otherwise, it is at best ineffective. 
This is, in fact, the empirical counterpart to the general theoretical proposition that in a 
second best world simply expanding the resource base may in fact do no good or may 
even immiserize a society. What matters, primarily, is domestic policy-and recall the 
complementarity between redistribution and efficiency in this case. Thus the evolution of 
inequality between nations is not independent of the inequality within each nation. 
7. CONCLUSION 
It could of course be argued that inequality never went away-it was always on 
the agenda in some form or another. The untidy way in which academic analysis 
advances means that one can always find discussion of a topic during the period it is 
­
claimed to have fallen off the radar screen. However, we believe that the turn of the 
... 
century has seen a resurgence of interest in inequality, and distribution more generally. 
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This resurgence is the culmination of several trends in the analytical, empirical and policy 
literature. 
First, the separation of distribution and allocative efficiency, an immediate 
implication of post war attempts to formalize Adam Smith's invisible hand, no longer 
holds sway. As the real world features of imperfect information and imperfect markets 
have been recognized and incorporated into the analytical framework, a more 
complicated terrain has emerged where equity and efficiency are integrally connected, 
and detailed analysis is required to discover these connections. 
Second, the empirical regularities between inequality and growth are increasingly 
being seen for what they are--regularities which have little in the way of specific policy 
implications. The current consensus is that there is no systematic empirical relationship 
between inequality and growth-but this type of "separation" only has policy 
implications if it is further assumed that there are separable sets of "growth" and 
"redistribution" policy instruments. Once specific policy instruments are considered, and 
this is what policy makers are interested in, inequality is back on the agenda. 
Third, aggregate measures of inequality have changed dramatically for some 
countries in the last decade. This has brought inequality back on the agenda for these 
countries, of course, but also more generally in terms of the implications for other 
countries. Now, it is true that inequality has not changed much for other countries, or has 
in fact declined in some. At the very least, however, there is the issue of why countries 
facing broadly similar global circumstances have had such widely different experiences 
on inequality change. What is it about the domestic circumstances that have led to these 
divergences ofoutcome? Such a question puts inequality back on the agenda. 
Fourth, whether aggregate inequality changed or not, recent empirical work is 
showing how the evolution of overall inequality is the outcome of a complex pattern of 
forces beneath the surface. These include the evolution of markets, assets and institutions, 
overlaid on basic demographic shifts. Understanding these forces is the real challenge 
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which takes us beyond the simple lack of a correlation between aggregate inequality and 
per capita income. It requires new techniques and opens up new avenues of policy 
analysis. 
Fifth, global divergence has put the issue of inequality between nations back on 
the agenda. In the last decade this has led to a rich literature on what determines relative 
growth rates and whether growing inequality between nations is inevitable. This debate is 
also linked to the role of foreign aid in overcoming the poverty traps which the literature 
has identified. 
The five strands of the literature we have identified look set to define the research 
and policy agenda in the first decade of the next century. They have already led to fruitful 
insights and significant policy implications, even beyond the realm of distributional 
analysis. Yes, inequality is definitely back on the agenda. 
-
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TABLE 2: 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF GDP PER CAPITA 
Year Coefficient of Variation 
1980 0.7575 
1985 0.7867 
1990 0.8083 
1995 0.8291 
1996 0.8294 
The 80s 0.7789 
The 90s 0.8210 
Note: The total number of countries included in the calculations 
is 61. 
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Notes:	 (1) Modeled after figure from Ravallion, Martin and S. Chen (1997). "What Can New Survey Data 
Tell Us about Recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?" The World Bank Economic Review 
11 (May): 357-82. This includes new data points available since the latter publication. 
(2) Points marked with "-t" represent data from economies in transition. 
(3) The figure is based on 103 non-overlapping observations for over 80 countries spanning from
 
the late 1970s to 1996.
 
(4) The fitted regression line was estimated excluding the former Soviet republics and the
 
countries of Eastem Europe.
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